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TORT LAW-LIABILITY OF COMMERCIAL VENDOR OF ALCOHOL-DuTY
DERIVED FROM VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTE-The North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals, absent a state civil damages act, has found
commercial vendor liability by deriving duty from the violation of
a criminal statute.
Hutchens v. Hankins, 303 S.E.2d 584 (N.C. Ct. App.), review de-
nied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
On March 19, 1981, an automobile driven by Donny Ray
Fletcher collided head-on with an automobile driven by Otis
Wayne Hutchens, resulting in the death of Mr. Hutchens.' Hutch-
ens' wife, Shirley K. Hutchens, instituted an action for the death
of her husband and injuries to her and her minor son, Mark, who
were passengers in the car.'
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that approximately fifteen min-
utes prior to the collision, Donny Ray Fletcher left the premises of
Younger Brothers Lounge where he had consumed a large quantity
of alcohol over a period of several hours.8 The plaintiffs further
claimed that as a result of Fletcher's consumption, he became in-
toxicated and negligently operated his automobile, causing the
head-on collision.4 The second cause of action alleged that the fur-
nishing of alcohol by Younger Brothers Lounge was a proximate
cause of the collision with the plaintiffs and that the furnishing of
such alcohol by Younger Brothers constituted negligence." Named
as defendants were Fletcher, Weldon Everett, owner of the car
Fletcher was driving, and Cicero and Martha Hankins, owners and
operators of Younger Brothers Lounge.6
The plaintiffs appealed from a dismissal of their action against
defendants Martha and Cicero Hankins.7Judge Johnson, writing for the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
noted that the sole question presented by the motion to dismiss





6. Id. Voluntary dismissals, with prejudice, were taken against defendants Fletcher
and Everett, and the cause of action against them was not the subject of this appeal. Id. at
587.
7. Id. at 586.
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was whether a common law dram shop liability exists in North
Carolina under the facts as presented.' The court divided the
plaintiffs' complaint into two theories of negligent conduct: (1) a
failure to exercise due care to avoid a reasonably foreseeable risk of
harm; and (2) violation of the North Carolina Beverage Control
Act as constituting negligence per se.
The court noted that at the time of the accident twenty-one
other jurisdictions statutorily provided "civil damages acts" or
"dram shop acts," for imposing liability against commercial ven-
dors, but North Carolina had no comparable legislation. 10 The
court further noted that although the North Carolina General As-
sembly had recently amended Chapter 18B of the General Statutes
to provide dram shop liability for negligent sales to minors, this
amendment reflected an "express declaration of no legislative in-
tent to include or preclude liability for sales to intoxicated per-
sons."'" Therefore, the court decided to treat the issue as do those
jurisdictions that have not statutorily provided for a cause of
8. Id. The court noted that the question of civil dram shop liability is one of first
impression in North Carolina. Its research disclosed no judicial decision addressing the
question under general principles of tort liability and no case in which a claim of negligence
had been predicated upon a violation of the North Carolina Beverage Control Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 18A-34 (1977) (repealed by 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, c. 412, s. 1, effective January
1, 1982). 303 S.E.2d at 587.
9. 303 S.E.2d at 588. Section 18A-34, in effect at the time of plaintiffs' injuries,
provided:
No holder of a license or permit authorizing the sale at retail of malt beverages or
wine (fortified or unfortified) for consumption on or off premises where sold, or any
servant, agent or employee of the licensee, shall do any of the following upon the
licensed premises . . . (2) knowingly sell such beverages to any person while such
person is in an intoxicated condition.
N.C. GEN STAT. § 18A-34 (1977). 303 S.E.2d at 587.
In 1981 when Chapter 18A was repealed, Chapter 18B was added. Similar to G.S. 18A-34,
§ 18B-305(a) provides: "It shall be unlawful for a permittee or his employee or for an ABC
store employee to knowingly sell or give alcoholic beverages to any person who is intoxi-
cated." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-305(a) (1981).
Section 18B-102(b) provides: "Violation of any provision of Chapter 18B, Regulation of
Alcoholic Beverages, shall constitute a misdemeanor, punishable by fine, imprisonment for
not more than two years, or both." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-102(b) (1981).
Three issues not decided by the Hutchens court were: "whether, under similar circum-
stances, (1) a noncommercial furnisher of alcoholic beverages may be subject to civil liabil-
ity; (2) whether a person who is served alcoholic beverages may recover for injuries suffered
as a result of such sale ... or, (3) whether off-premises retailers may be held civilly liable
for sales or furnishing of alcohol to intoxicated customers." 303 S.E.2d at 587.
10. 303 S.E.2d at 588.
11. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302 (1981) provides in pertinent part: "(a) Sale.-It
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly: (1) Sell or give malt beverages or unfortified
wine to anyone less than 18 years old; or (2) Sell or give fortified wine, spiritous liquor, or




Proceeding with an historical analysis of civil dram shop liabil-
ity, Judge Johnson noted that under the common law rule, no
cause of action existed for an injured party against one furnishing
liquor to intoxicated persons. 8 The theory on which the common
law rule was based was that the drinking of the liquor, not the
remote furnishing of it, was the proximate cause of the injury.' A
second rationale advanced in support of the common law rule was
that even if the furnishing of alcohol was found to have caused the
patron's intoxication, the subsequent third party injury was an un-
foreseeable result of that action.' 5
Referring to recent decisions in dram shop liability, Judge John-
son noted that most state and federal courts considering liquor
vendor liability issues since 1960 have reevaluated the non-liability
rule. "'6 He further recognized that nearly every court permitting a
claim for relief premised the action for negligence on the violation
of a statutory duty.'7 Judge Johnson explained that courts deriving
vendor liability from violation of a criminal statute have also con-
12. 303 S.E.2d at 588.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. See Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (Md. App. 1951)
("[h]uman beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts. The law [apart frpm
statute] recognizes no relation of proximate cause between the sale of liquor and a tort
committed by a buyer who has drunk the liquor"). The Hutchens court noted that the other
common justification for adherence to the old rule is that, in the final analysis, the control-
ling consideration is one of public policy, and the decision as to liability should be left to the
legislature. See, e.g., Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
16. 303 S.E.2d at 589. The court noted that the old rule was that the sale or service of
alcohol to an intoxicated patron was "causally remote from the subsequent injurious con-
duct of the patron." Id.
17. On appeal the plaintiffs contended that the North Carolina General Assembly had
established a statutory duty not to sell alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons by enact-
ing G.S. 18A-34, and that violation of this statute was negligence per se, giving rise to a
cause of action. Id.
The plaintiffs urged the court to follow the reasoning of courts which have (1) imposed
liability on a vendor who violates a liquor control law prohibiting sales to those known to be
intoxicated and (2) held that the furnishing of liquor to an intoxicated person may be a
proximate cause of third party injuries. Id.
The court listed 28 cases which recognized a claim for relief against a licensed vendor,
premising the action for negligence upon the violation of a statutory duty of licensees to
refrain from selling or serving alcoholic beverages to customers already visibly intoxicated.
Id. at 589 n.6. The court further noted that the two leading cases abrogating or modifying
the common law rule are Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960) and Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1
(1959). 303 S.E.2d at 590. For a more complete discussion of these cases see infra notes 62-
69 and accompanying text.
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sidered the element of proximate cause.18 Noting that these courts
have rejected contentions that even if negligence is found, there is
no proximate relationship between this negligence and third party
injuries,19 the judge pointed, with approval, to the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of California in Vesely v. Sager.2 0 In Vesely the
California court concluded that furnishing alcoholic beverages to
intoxicated persons may be considered a proximate cause of inju-
ries to third parties. 21 Judge Johnson observed that the principles
of proximate cause set forth in Vesely are substantially identical to
those developed by the North Carolina Supreme Court and con-
cluded that recent case law, and the modern trend toward imposi-
tion of liability, persuaded the court that liability may be imposed
when negligence is proved. 2
Beginning with the element of duty, Judge Johnson continued
by setting forth the elements of a common law dram shop action. 3
The plaintiffs had argued that a violation of the North Carolina
Beverage Control Act, G.S. 18A-34 constituted negligence per se
because the statute set a minimum standard of care and defen-
dants' violation was unexcused.2 4 Although G.S. 18A-34 had never
previously been so construed, the judge noted that the general pur-
poses of the statute appear to be protecting the customer from the
adverse consequences of intoxication and protecting the commu-
18. 303 S.E.2d at 590-91. See, e.g., Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
The Sutton court stated:
In this jurisdiction, to warrant a finding that negligence, not amounting to a willful or
wanton wrong, was a proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the tortfeasor
should have reasonably foreseen that injurious consequences were likely to follow
from his negligent conduct. It is not necessary that a defendant anticipate the partic-
ular consequences which ultimately result from his negligence. It is only required that
a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or
some similar injurious result, was probable under the facts as they existed.
Id. at 107, 176 S.E.2d at 168-69 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). See Watters v.
Parish, 252 N.C. 787, 796-97, 115 S.E.2d 1, 7-8 (1960) ("It is well settled that the negligence
of one tortfeasor cannot be insulated by the negligence of another so long as the negligence
of the first plays a substantial and proximate part in the injury. .. .
19. 303 S.E.2d at 591.
20. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) ("an actor may be liable if his
negligence is a substantial factor in causing an injury, and he is not relieved of liability
because of the intervening act of a third person if such act was reasonably foreseeable at the
time of his negligent conduct"). 303 S.E.2d at 591.
21. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d at 163-64, 486 P.2d at 158-59, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31.
22. 303 S.E.2d at 591. See Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970); Watters
v. Parish, 252 N.C. 787, 115 S.E.2d 1 (1960), supra note 18.
23. 303 S.E.2d at 591-92. See Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
24. 303 S.E.2d at 592. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-34 (1977).
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nity at large.25 Accordingly, Judge Johnson adopted the require-
ments of G.S. 18A-34 as the minimum standard of conduct for de-
fendant-licensees and held that a violation of this statute can give
rise to an action for negligence.26 In determining that the legisla-
ture, through G.S. 18A-34, imposed a specific duty, the court did
not find it necessary to reach the plaintiffs' arguments based on
general tort principles of duty and reasonable care. 7
The second element of negligence addressed by the court was
the violation, or breach, of an imposed duty.'6 A violation of G.S.
18A-34 required a sale to a person the licensee knew to be intoxi-
cated.2 9 The court found that to impose civil liability for a viola-
tion of G.S. 18A-34, the plaintiffs had to allege and prove: (1) that
the patron was intoxicated and (2) that the licensee knew or
should have-known that the patron was intoxicated at the time he
25. 303 S.E.2d at 593.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 594. The court referred to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tows § 285 (1965)
for how a standard of conduct of a reasonable man is determined, and § 286 for when a
standard of conduct defined by legislation will be adopted. 303 S.E.2d at 594 (quoting Rz-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965)). Section 285 reads as follows:
The standard of conduct of a reasonable man may be:
(a) established by a legislative enactment or administrative regulation which
so provides, or
(b) adopted by the court from a legislative enactment or administrative regu-
lation which does not so provide, or
(c) established by judicial decision, or
(d) applied to the facts of the case by the trial judge if there is no such enact-
ment, regulation or decision.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965). Section 286 provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the require-
ments of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is to
be found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is in-
vaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm that has resulted, and
(d) to promote that interest against the particular hazard from which the
harm results.
Id. § 286 (1965).
The court also cited two cases which relate a standard of conduct defined by legislation to
the sale of liquor: Marusa v. Dist. of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and Jardine v.
Upper Darby Lodge, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964). For a more complete discussion of
Jardine see infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
28. 303 S.E.2d at 594.
29. Id. The court noted that most jurisdictions imposing civil liability on the basis of
violations of alcohol control statutes require notice on the part of the defendant tavern own-
er that the patron was intoxicated at the time of serving, regardless of whether the element
of notice is contained in the applicable statute. Id.
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or she was served.30 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' allega-
tions stated a claim for negligence per se sufficient to withstand
the defendants' motion to dismiss.3"
Finally, the court addressed the element of proximate cause.32
The defendants raised a concern as to whether the illegal sale of
further drinks to an intoxicated customer was sufficient to estab-
lish the defendants' liability for subsequent third party injury.33 In
reply to this concern, Judge Johnson noted that if a plaintiff
proves that a visibly intoxicated patron has been served and that
this serving resulted in injury to a third party, a permissible infer-
ence may be drawn that the illegal serving was a proximate cause
of the injury.3 4 Pointing to the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Majors v. Broadhead Hotel,3 5 Judge Johnson noted that
this permissible inference is rebuttable if the defendant proves the
customer was so intoxicated at the time of the sale that the acci-
dent would have occurred despite the illegal sale.36 Addressing this
same issue, he pointed out that the court in Watters v. Parish
3 7
used a test of reasonable foreseeabilty to determine whether the
negligent conduct of one is to be insulated, as a matter of law, by
the independent negligent act of another.38 Concluding that the
principles of proximate and intervening cause developed by the
North Carolina Supreme Court were in agreement with the reason-
ing of cited case law,3 9 Judge Johnson rejected the defendants'
claim that the drinking patron, alone, is responsible for subsequent
injuries to innocent third parties.40
The court also rejected the defendants' claim that public policy
was the controlling consideration, relying on the dissenting opinion
30. Id. at 595. See Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
31. 303 S.E.2d at 595.
32. Id. See Lutz Indus. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 341, 88 S.E.2d 333, 339
(1955) in which it was established that to make out a case of actionable negligence in North
Carolina the additional element of proximate cause is required. In analyzing the element of
proximate cause, the court relied on the definition presented in Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94,
176 S.E.2d 161 (1970). See supra note 18.
33. 303 S.E.2d at 596.
34. Id.
35. 416 Pa. 265, 272-73, 205 A.2d 873, 878 (1965).
36. 303 S.E.2d at 596.
37. 252 N.C. 787, 115 S.E.2d 1 (1960).
38. 303 S.E.2d at 596.
39. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960), Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) and
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). See also notes 22, 62,
66 and accompanying text.
40. 303 S.E.2d at 597.
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in Garcia v. Hargrove4' and the tendency of courts to expand lia-
bility to compensate those wronged by another's torts.42 Thus the
court concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted and that it properly alleged the ele-
ments of foreseeability and proximate cause, and so held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to be heard on the merits.43
A drunk driving accident may be the result of the unreasonable
risk-producing activity of several parties: not only the intoxicated
motorist, but also the licensed liquor vendor who sells to, or social
host who serves, an obviously intoxicated person." Historically,
four approaches have been taken by courts in assigning liability in
actions brought against such risk producers. These approaches in-
clude: (1) traditional common law non-liability;45 (2) liability im-
posed through the application of dram shop or civil damages acts;
4"
(3) liability based on the derivation of a vendor's duty from crimi-
nal statutes;47 and (4) liability derived from basic common law tort
principles.
48
Under traditional common law principles, the liquor vendor and
social host have been insulated from civil liability.49 The rationale
for this approach was that the law recognized no relation of proxi-
mate cause between the sale of liquor and the subsequent tort of a
patron.50 It was believed that the consumption of alcohol, and not
its sale, was the proximate cause of subsequent torts.51
The legislative response to the problems of vendors' liability was
the enactment of "dram shop acts," or "civil damages acts," which
41. 46 Wis. 2d 724, 737, 776 N.W.2d 566, 572 (1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting) (the
majority reaffirmed, by a 4-3 decision, the common law rule of nonliability on the control-
ling consideration of public policy).
42. 303 S.E.2d at 598.
43. Id. at 599.
44. Comment, Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial Response, 57 CALiF. L. REV. 995
(1969).
45. See Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 757 (1951). See also infra notes 50, 57,
58 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
47. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). See also infra notes 57,
59, 62 and accompanying text.
48. See Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964). See also
infra notes 60, 70, 71 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831
(1965); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970). See generally 45 AM.
JuR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors 553 (1969); 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 430 (1947).
50. See Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 757 (1951).
51. 303 S.E.2d at 587. See supra note 14.
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now exist in twenty-one jurisdictions.5" Dram shop acts arose as
early as the 1880's in response to the clamor of the women's tem-
perance movement. 8 Enactment of most civil damages acts came
at a time in American history when automobiles were relatively
few in number, and the potential damage which could be caused by
an intoxicated motorist was minimal."4 Judicial construction of
dram shop acts has been very liberal, even to the point of deriving
a duty for social hosts,"5 but social conditions have changed drasti-
cally since their enactment, creating burdens not contemplated by
the legislatures when the acts were formulated. For this reason,
and other recognized weaknesses, a substantial number of jurisdic-
tions repealed their dram shop acts and returned to common law
non-liability status.6
Until the early 1960's, jurisdictions which had never enacted
dram shop acts, or which had repealed their acts, consistently ad-
hered to the common law rule of non-liability. 5' These courts were
convinced that any other judicial action would have been a usurpa-
tion of legislative power.'5 The 1960's marked the beginning of a
reevaluation of strict adherence to the common law.' 9 This reevalu-
52. 303 S.E.2d at 588. For examples of dram shop acts see Note, Liquor Vendor Lia-
bility for Injuries Caused by Intoxicated Patrons-A Question of Policy, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
630 & nn.9, 11-12 (1974).
53. See Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL.
L.F. 175 (1958) ("[ajlthough the National Temperance Movement did not effectuate the
18th Amendment to the Constitution until 1919, prior to that time prohibitionists lobbied
state legislatures to pass Dram Shop Acts designed to control the liquor traffic").
54. Id. Dram Shop acts appeared as early as 1853 in Indiana. See Struble v. Nodwift,
11 Ind. 64 (1853).
55. See, e.g., Roberts v. Casey, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 89, 225 A.2d 836 (1966). See also Ross
v. Ross, 294 Minn. 155, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
56. Some of the states which have done so are: Indiana, see Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind.
598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Massachusetts, see Barboza v. Decas, 311 Mass. 10, 40 N.E.2d
10 (1942); New Hampshire, see Ramsey v. Anotil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); New
Jersey, see Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Pennsylvania, see Schelin
v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
57. See, e.g., Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Cole v. Rush, 45
Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530
(1949); Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951).
58. See, e.g., Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951). The Joyce court
stated:
In the face of the flood of civil damage laws enacted, amended and repealed in other
states and the Volstead Act and of the total absence of authority for such liability
apart from statute-the fact that there is now no such law in Maryland expresses the
legislative intent as clearly and compellingly as affirmative legislation would.
Id. at 256, 78 A.2d at 757. See also supra note 10.
59. See Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Adamian v. Three Sons,
Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393
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ation initially took the form of deriving a vendor's duty from a
generous judicial interpretation of state penal statutes which pro-
hibited the sale of alcohol to minors or intoxicated patrons.60 Once
the vendor's duty had been established, the courts had no trouble
resolving the issue of proximate cause, the issue which had been
the basic defense of the old common law non-liability approach.61
Rappaport v. Nichols,6 2 considered to be the landmark case in
this reevaluation trend, involved tavern owner defendants who had
served alcohol to an already intoxicated minor who was subse-
quently involved in a fatal accident.63 At the time of the accident
New Jersey had no civil damages act, but prohibited, through a
criminal statute and prohibitory regulations, sales of alcoholic bev-
erages to minors and intoxicated patrons." The court proceeded to
derive a vendor's duty from these prohibitory measures, noting
that such broad restrictions could not have been intended to pro-
tect only minors and intoxicated persons, but were for the protec-
tion of the general public as well.5
The Rappaport court followed the logic of the court in Waynick
v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store," decided in the same year. In Way-
nick, a Michigan resident was injured in Michigan by an intoxi-
cated Illinois motorist. 7 Although the dram shop acts of Michigan
and Illinois were inapplicable because they did not apply extrater-
ritorially, the court reasoned that the lack of an applicable dram
shop act did not preclude a finding of liability and the defendant
S.W.2d 755 (1964), for examples of this reevaluation in states which followed the strict com-
mon law rule.
See Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375,
211 A.2d 900 (1965); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964), for
examples of this reevaluation in states which had repealed their dram shop acts.
See Colligan v. Cousar, 38 I. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Berkeley v. Park, 47
Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965), for examples of reevaluation in jurisdictions which
still had dram shop acts in effect.
60. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
61. See Comment, supra note 44, at 1007 (1969). See also Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d at
163-64, 486 P.2d at 158-59, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31 ("To the extent that the common law
rule of nonliability is based on concepts of proximate cause, we are persuaded by the reason-
ing of cases that have abandoned that rule.
62. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
63. Id. at 192, 156 A.2d at 3.
64. Id. at 200, 156 A.2d at 8.
65. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8 ("It seems clear to us that these broadly expressed restric-
tions were not narrowly intended to benefit the minors and intoxicated persons alone, but
were wisely intended for the protection of members of the general public as well.").
66. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
67. 269 F.2d at 324.
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was held to be in violation of an Illinois criminal code prohibiting
sales to intoxicated persons.6 s To establish a duty on the part of
the vendor to protect members of the public, the judge in Waynick
referred to the broad public purposes of a statutory prohibition
against the sale of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons and
found, therefore, liability based on negligence.1e
As did the courts in Rappaport, Waynick, and Hutchens, many
courts which have reevaluated vendor's liability since 1960, and
which have recognized a claim for relief, have grounded their rea-
soning in the interpretation of state penal statutes prohibiting the
sale of alcohol to minors or intoxicated persons.70 This technique
of deriving a vendor's duty for actionable negligence from the vio-
lation of a statutory duty (i.e. negligence per se), has been referred
to by commentators as the "new common law rule.
7 1
A fourth approach, which reaches results similar to the "new
common law" approach, is a method which imposes liability by de-
riving a tavern owner's duty from basic common law tort princi-
ples. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Jardine v. Upper Darby
Lodge,7 upheld, on grounds other than a violation of a statutory
duty, the liability of a tavern owner for serving an intoxicated pa-
tron.78 The appellant in Jardine argued that the 1951 repeal of the
Pennsylvania dram shop act left the court with no basis upon
which to impose civil liability.7 ' The Jardine court, however, fol-
68. Id. at 324-25.
69. Id. at 326. The court stated:
In applying the common law to the situation presented in this case, we must consider
the law of tort liability. . . .We hold that, under the facts appearing in the com-
plaint, the tavern keepers are liable in tort for the damages and injuries sustained by
plaintiffs, as a proximate result of the unlawful acts of the former.
Id.
70. See, e.g., Marusa v. Dist. of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (shooting
victim allowed to recover from bar owner for negligent conduct of intoxicated patron); Davis
v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963) (violation of statutory prohibition of sale to
minor); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966) (violation of statutory prohibi-
tion of sale to minor); Grasser v. Fleming, 74 Mich. App. 338, 253 N.W.2d 757 (1977) (sale to
compulsive alcoholic contrary to private agreement); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611,
213 N.W.2d 820 (1973) (social host serving minor in violation of penal statute); Ramsey v.
Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965) (patron who injured himself while inebriated).
71. See Comment, supra note 44, at 1005. See also Note, New Common Law Dram
Shop Rule, 9 CLEv. MAR. L. REv. 302 (1960).
72. 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
73. Id. at 631, 198 A.2d at 553. The court noted: "The first prime requisite to de-
intoxicate one, who has, because of alcohol, lost control over his reflexes, judgment and
sense of responsibility to others, is to stop pouring alcohol into him. This is a duty which




lowed with approval the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Schelin v. Goldberg,7 5 and ruled that the repeal of the
dram shop act did not eliminate the remedy which the act had
provided for victims of intoxicated tortfeasors.7 6 The Jardine court
held that the duty of a tavern owner to refrain from serving an
already visibly intoxicated patron was "a duty owed to society, en-
tirely apart from any statute.
77
The present trend of courts to expand liability in drunk driving
accidents is the result of a number of deficiences recognized in pre-
vious approaches to the problem. A major deficiency of the old
common law rule of non-liability is that it totally excludes one
class of risk producers-commercial vendors and social
hosts-leaving an innocent victim with a tort action against only
the driver, who is often inadequately insured. 8
Similarly, although dram shop acts are an improvement over to-
tal non-liability, they appear to be an inadequate solution to the
problem, as they are unjust to both the innocent victim and the
defendant tavern owner.7 The victim is likely to find that he will
not be justly compensated due to statutory restrictions, including
restrictions on who may recover, restrictions on the dollar amount
of recovery, or even short statutes of limitations.8" The tavern own-
er, on the other hand, may find that he will be held liable whether
or not he departed from due care standards.8 ' Added to these fac-
tors is the very real and rapid change in social conditions. The era
of few cars, few drivers and a walk to the neighborhood tavern, the
era in which, and for which, dram shop acts were created, has
given way to overcrowded highways in a very mobile America.
The third or new common law approach of deriving duty and,
therefore, liability, from a violation of state penal regulations
75. 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958) (vendor found liable under the Pennsylva-
nia Liquor Code for serving an intoxicated patron who subsequently became involved in an
argument with another patron and was struck and injured by the other patron).
76. 413 Pa. at 631, 198 A.2d at 553. "When an act embodying in expressed terms a
principle of law is repealed by the legislature, then the principle as it existed at common law
is still in force." Id. (quoting Schelin, 188 Pa. Super. at 341, 146 A.2d at 648).
77. 413 Pa. at 631, 198 A.2d at 553.
78. See Comment, supra note 44, at 996. See also Note, The Constitutionality of Civil
Nonliability of Vendors and Social Hosts Serving Alcohol to Intoxicated Persons, 9 PEP-
Pminnqz L. REV: 784, 797 (1982) ("By imposing liability upon the drinker and immunizing
the provider, the legislature has only affected the innocent third person who is of course the
victim at the end of the chain of causation.").
79. See Comment, iupra note 44, at 997 & nn.7-9.




seems to be a workable solution, however cumbersome and unnec-
essary. Even this approach is subject to potential problems. Mor-
ris, in his work on negligence per se, warns that if the doctrine is
applied too liberally it may lead to liability without fault, by al-
lowing civil liability to arise from a generally excusable act which
technically violated the statute.82 Safeguards, such as that recog-
nized by the Hutchens court (that a rebuttable presumption of
negligence exists) must be well defined and given effect.83 Although
other legislative solutions are possible, specific legislation should
not be required to impose liability for the negligent sale of liquor
any more than it is necessary to impose liability for any other con-
duct recognizable by a reasonable man as risk-producing."'
The most workable solution seems to be the reasoning of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Jardine, 8 and the application of
basic common law principles of negligence. It is submitted that ba-
sic goals of tort law, including equitable allocation of losses and
future deterrence of risk-producing activity, can best be met
through the application of these flexible principles. Some jurisdic-
tions refuse to apply common law principles of negligence on the
basis that legislative action in repealing a dram shop act, or legisla-
tive silence in not enacting such statutes, indicates the legislature's
final intent and any judicial action would be a usurpation of legis-
lative power.8 7 This thinking appears fallacious in view of the fact
that the common law rule of non-liability was judicially created.
82. See Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REV.
453, 458-59 (1933). A plaintiff's particular injuries must have been the type of harm antici-
pated by the legislature in drafting the statute before a rational imposition of negligence per
se can be justified. Id. "The difficulty with the negligence per se procedure is not that it has
resulted in an untraditional placement of the function of formulating standards, but that
the function has not yet been clearly placed where it belongs-with the judiciary, rather
than with the legislature." Id. at 465.
83. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
84. See Comment, supra note 44, at 1000 & n.28. The author suggests:
Such a statute could provide for secondary liability for the commercial supplier for all
damages caused to third parties by his negligent sales and uncompensated by tort
recovery against the vendee. To deter negligent sales the statute could provide for a
fine or punitive damages whenever the supplier was found liable. Finally, to guaran-
tee adequate recovery, such a statute could require that licensed commercial suppli-
ers carry liability insurance, or an equivalent bond.
Id.
85. See Johnson, Drunken Driving-The Civil Responsibility of the Purveyor of In-
toxicating Liquor, 37 IND. L.J. 317, 330 (1962).
86. 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964). See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
87. See Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 354, 289 P.2d 450, 455 (1955).
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Recent Decisions
The dissent in Garcia v. Hargrove,8" upon which Judge Johnson
relied in the instant case, stated that the court has a duty to
change the common law to meet changing needs and is not com-
pelled to defer such changes to the legislature." One commentator
has pointed out that the legislature may rationally prefer to act, if
at all, after the common law has satisfied its need for sensible re-
form. 90 Thus a lack of positive action by legislatures should not
obstruct much needed reevaluation of common law principles as
they relate to imposition of civil liability on negligent liquor
vendors.
Prosser has defined the law of torts as being concerned with the
allocation of losses arising out of human activities.91 It is well rec-
ognized that the consumption of alcohol is a human activity often
resulting in grave losses." Application by the courts of basic com-
mon law principles of negligence to determine the elements of duty
and proximate cause in drunk driving accidents will result in equi-
table allocation of these grave losses, thus using tort law to its
most constructive social advantage.' 8
Policy considerations have been recognized by courts as playing
a dominant role in determining whether a duty is owed by a defen-
dant to a particular plaintiff." It seems quite reasonable and effi-
cient for these same policy considerations to be utilized to deter-
mine whether a liquor vendor or social host owes a duty to a
particular plaintiff. Some policy factors to be weighed may include:
(1) future deterrence; (2) the social utility of the act versus the risk
involved; (3) availability of practical means of prevention, and
which party is better able to adopt such means; and (4) equitable
allocation of financial loss.9"
88. 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
89. 303 S.E.2d at 598 (quoting Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d at 737, 176 N.W.2d at
572 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting)).
90. See Friedman, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 COLUM. L. Rzv. 821,
838 (1961).
91. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 6 (4th ed. 1971).
92. See Slicer v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, 429 A.2d 855 (1980). According to the Na-
tional Safety Council, the Department of Transportation, and other sources, alcohol-related
accidents now account for as much as one-half of all highway deaths-or about 25,000 fatali-
ties annually-and represent an estimated annual economic cost of over $5 billion. Id. at
264-67, 429 A.2d at 861-62 (quoting Govmuwxwrr Accou wrri OFFICE, THE DRuiKNo-
DRIVER PROBLEM-WHAT CAN BE DONE ABoUT IT?, REPORT OF THE COMPTRoLLER GENERAL
TO CONGRESS, February 21, 1979).
93. See Comment, supra note 44, at 995-96.
94. Id. at 1016.
95. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971). "But it
should be recognized that 'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum
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This process is adaptable and would allow the concepts of duty
in particular jurisdictions to change with changing social condi-
tions.9 6 This approach would also allow flexibility in the determi-
nation of social host liability. Prior formulas have failed in this re-
spect. Neither the old common law approach, civil damages acts,
nor criminal statutes provide for non-commercial liability.97
In-depth discussion of the social utility of alcohol consumption
in a private setting and potential social host liability is beyond the
scope of this note. It should be pointed out, however, that the im-
plementation of a "newer" common law approach would provide a
basis for flexible and fair determinations in such cases. This ap-
proach would allow flexibility in the sense that basic tort principles
do not differentiate between commercial and non-commercial ven-
dors, and it would allow fairness because the courts would not be
required to derive the element of duty from the interpretation of
criminal statutes."1
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff
is entitled to protection." Id.
Prosser explains:
Various factors undoubtedly have been given conscious or unconscious weight, includ-
ing convenience of administration, capacity of the parties to bear the loss, a policy of
preventing future injuries, the moral blame attached to the wrongdoer and many
others. Changing social conditions lead constantly to the recognition of new duties.
No better general statement can be made, than that the courts will find a duty where,
in general, reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists.
Id. at 326-27.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. See also Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark.
889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965). In Carr, fear of private liability suggested by a civil application
of a prohibitory statute served as the justification for denying the liability of a commercial
vendor. Id. at 889, 385 S.W.2d at 656. The court concluded that granting plaintiff relief
would result in compelling the private person entertaining friends in his home to maintain
supervision over all his guests and refuse to serve drinks to those nearing the point of intox-
ication. Id. at 891, 385 S.W.2d at 658.
The courts' refusal to impose civil liability on social hosts was often premised on the fact
that a social host would be under an undue burden to detect intoxication:
Obvious intoxication is often recognizable only after the fact, and what is patent
when the drinker falls off his bar stool may have been only latent 60 seconds ear-
lier. . . .Visual diagnosis of intoxication has not greatly improved upon Peacock's
rough and ready classification of 1929: "Not drunk is he who from the floor Can rise
alone and still drink more; But drunk is he, who prostrate lies, Without the power to
drink or rise."
Cooper v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 393 n.1, 119 Cal. Rptr. 541,
544 n.1 (1975), rev'd, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
98. For an example where social host liability was found from a criminal statute see
Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 21 Cal. 2d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534 (1978) (Passenger injured in an automobile accident brought an action against owner
and manager of an apartment complex for serving an intoxicated person when it was reason-
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In view of the inadequacies of the three methods commonly used
in dealing with drunk driving accident liability, refusal by the
courts to apply common law negligence principles in the determi-
nation of commercial and non-commercial vendor liability is not in
keeping with the goals of basic tort law. Both the old common law
approach and civil damages acts have proven to be inflexible and
inadequate as methods of satisfactorily compensating the injured
and promoting a measure of deterrence. Although the so-called
"new common law approach" of deriving duty from criminal stat-
utes is feasible, it is unnecessary and requires extensive statutory
interpretation by the courts. Perhaps the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Jardine has pointed the way towards a fourth solution
that is both flexible and fair-application of basic common law
negligence principles. In light of the fragmented evolution of com-
mercial and non-commercial vendor liability and the reluctance of
the legislatures to take effective action, it appears clear that appli-
cation by the courts of traditional common law negligence princi-
ples on a case by case basis is warranted.
Madelyn A. Reilly
ably foreseeable that she would drive. The court held the word 'person' in the applicable
statute to mean social hosts as well as commercial suppliers.).
In 1978 the California legislature amended California law with the result that liquor ven-
dors and social hosts are immune from civil liability on the theory that the consumption and
not the furnishing of alcohol is the proximate cause of any resulting injuries. CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 25602(b) (West 1978 & Supp. 1981).
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